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TAX LAW 
THE APPELLATE DECISION IN LYNCH: 
A CONTINUING QUEST TO DEFINE 
THE INTEREST PROHIBITED 
BY SECTION 302(c) 
MATI'HEW B. KRASNER* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Section 302 of the Internal Revenue Codel provides the 
statutory framework for distinguishing between corporate distri-
butions made in redemption of the distributee corporation's 
stock which are to be treated as a sale or exchange by the re-
deeming shareholder and those which are to be less favorably 
treated as essentially equivalent to the distribution of an ordi-
nary dividend.2 Distributions in redemption of a corporation's 
stock are taxed to the redeeming shareholder as dividends3 un-
less the redemption satisfies one of the exceptions of section 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Catholic University of America. Professor Krasner 
recieved an LL.M in taxation from Georgetown University and an LL.B from Havard 
University. . 
1. All references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 unless otherwise noted. 
2. Unless the redeeming shareholder is a dealer in securities, a sale or exchange will 
be accorded capital gain or loss treatment pursuant to I.R.C. § 1221, whereas a dividend 
distribution within the meaning of I.R.C. § 316 is taxed as ordinary income. Although for 
years after 1987, the rate differential favoring capital transactions has been repealed by 
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, §§ 1 and 301, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986), charac-
terization of a redemption as a sale or exchange has the continuing advantage of limiting 
taxable income to the excess of the redemption proceeds over the basis of the shares 
redeemed, as distinguished from dividend characterization which subjects the gross 
amount distributed to taxation. 
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302(b):' These exceptions include a reacquisition of shares which 
effects a complete termination of the redeeming shareholder's 
stock interest in the corporation.1I For purposes of this determi-
nation statutory rules of constructive ownership provide, in rele-
vant part, that a redeeming shareholder is considered to own the 
stock owned by certain members of his family.6 Without more, 
these rules would effectively inhibit passing a wholly owned fam-
ily business from one generation to another by means of a re-
demption transaction. For example, assume a father desires to 
retire from the family business and allow his son to assume con-
trol, but in order to do so needs to withdraw significant monies 
from the corporation to fund his retirement. A redemption of 
most of the father's shares for cash, with a gift of his remaining 
shares to the son, would accomplish these results, but unfortu-
nately the son's shares would be attributed to the father causing 
the distribution in redemption to be taxed as a dividend rather 
than an exchange.' In order that these legitimate family and 
4. I.R.C. § 302(b) provides, in part, as follows: 
(b) Redemptions Treated as Exchanges-
(1) Subsection (a) shall apply if the redemption is not es-
sentially equivalent to a dividend. 
(2) Substantially Disproportionate Redemption of 
Stock-
(A) In General- Subsection (a) shall apply if the distri-
bution is substantially disproportionate with respect to the 
shareholder .... 
(3) Subsection(a) shall apply if the redemption is in com-
plete redemption of all of the stock of the corporation owned 
by the shareholder. 
(4) Subsection (a) shall apply to a distribution if such 
distribution is-
(A) in redemption of stock held by a shareholder who is 
not a corporation, and 
(B) in partial liquidation of the distributing corporation. 
I.R.C. § 302(a) provides for exchange treatment of the redemption transaction if any 
of the above exceptions applies. 
5. I.R.C. § 302(b)(3). 
6. I.R.C. § 318(a) provides, in part, as follows: 
(1) Members of Family-
(A) In General- An individual shall be considered as 
owning the stock owned, directly or indirectly, by or for-
(i) his spouse (other than a spouse who is legally sepa-
rated from the individual under a decree of divorce or sepa-
rate maintenance), and 
(ii) his children, grandchildren, and parents. 
7. Pursuant to the hypothetical, father owns 100% of the stock of the corporation 
prior to the redemption and, since the son owns all of the outstanding stock following 
the redemption, continues as the sole owner by virtue of attribution of the son's shares 
2
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business purposes may be achieved, without being unfairly in-
hibited by adverse tax consequences, the statute permits the 
rules of family attribution to be waived under certain limited 
conditions.8 By so providing, the retiring family member can ter-
minate his interest and achieve capital gain treatment for the 
proceeds of redemption, whereas in the absence of such waiver 
the redemption proceeds might be taxed less favorably as the 
equivalent of a dividend distribution.9 
Thus, it is extremely important to plan a redemption in a 
manner which satisfies the technical requirements for waiving 
family attribution as this is often the critical element which per-
mits the transaction to qualify for favorable tax treatment as an 
exchange. Unfortunately, the tax planning necessary to achieve 
this end is often hindered by the uncertainties created as a re-
sult of the conflicting interpretations of the waiver requirements 
by the Internal Revenue Service10 and the Tax Court. A redeem-
ing shareholder may waive family attribution provided he has 
not retained an "interest" in the redeeming corporation, includ-
ing an interest as an employee, officer or director, which is pro-
hibited by section 302(c)(2)(A).11 The Tax Court has construed 
the "interest" prohibited by this section to require a retained 
to him under loR.C. § 318(a)(1). Since the father owns 100% both before and after the 
redemption, the transaction is treated as a dividend and not an exchange. U.S. v. Davis, 
397 U.S. 1071 (1970). 
8. These conditions are set forth in loR.C. § 302(c)(2)(A) which provides in relevant 
part: 
(A) In the case of a distribution described in subsection (b) 
(3), section 318(a)(1) shall not apply if- (i) immediately after 
the distribution the distributee has no interest in the corpora-
tion (including an interest as an officer, director or employee), 
other than an interest as a creditor, 
(ii) The distributee does not acquire any such interest (other 
than stock acquired by bequest or inheritance) within 10 years 
from the date of such distribution, and 
(iii) the distributee files an agreement to notify the Secretary 
of any acquisition described in clause (ii) •••• 
9. Even in the absence of a waiver of family attribution, a distributee may he enti-
tled to exchange treatment pursuant to one of the other exceptions of I.R.C. § 302(b), as 
for example, the percentage tests for a disproportionate redemption of I.R.C. § 302(b)(2) 
or the rules of corporate contraction of I.R.C. § 302(b)(4). 
10. Hereinafter referred to as the "Service." 
11. See supra note 8. "Interest" is defined only in terms of the specifically prohib-
ited employee, officer and director relationships and the equally specific approval of a 
creditor relationship. This failure to provide a more encompassing definition, at least in 
part, is the cause of the uncertainties of interpretation discussed subsequently. 
3
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financial stake in future corporate profits or continued control of 
the redeeming corporation.12 It has permitted the waiver of fam-
ily attribution even though a shareholder has continued as an 
officer, director or employee of the redeeming corporation, de-
spite the contrary language of the statute, where the specifics of 
that relationship were found not to constitute a financial stake 
or provide continuing managerial control.13 The Service, natu-
rally, opts for a strict construction of the statute pursuant to 
which any employment relationship, including that of an inde-
pendent contractor (although such status is not specifically ex-
cepted in the statute), is a per se prohibited interest. 1" 
The uncertainty created by these differing interpretations 
has been exacerbated by the recent decision in Lynch v. Com-
missioner/I> in which an appellate court for the first time has 
overruled the Tax Court and accepted the statutory construction 
favored by the Service.16 This author considers both positions to 
be flawed. The Service and the Ninth Circuit decision in Lynch 
go too far by including all employment relationships within the 
per se prohibition. Similarly, the Tax Court does not go far 
enough in that it requires a review of the facts and circum-
stances in each case to determine the existence of a prohibited 
interest and to that extent fails to give sufficient credence to the 
specific language of the statute which designates status as an of-
ficer, director or employee as a prohibited interest. 
A clearer and more balanced picture must be developed as 
to the "interest" intended to be prohibited by the statute. Not 
necessarily because the contradictory interpretations of the Tax 
Court and the Service invariably lead to differing or erroneous 
results, they often do not,I'1 but to provide more guidance where 
12. Estate of Lennard v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 554 (1974); Chertkof v. Commis-
sioner, 72 T.C. 1113 (1979) aft'd, 649 F. 2d 264 (4th Cir. 1981); see also Lewis v. Commis-
sioner, 47 T.C. 129, 137 (1966) (Simpson, J., concurring). 
13. See Lisle v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M.(CCH) 627 (1976). 
14. Rev. Rul. 70-104, 1970-1 C.B. 66; Rev. Rul. 59-119, 1959-1 C.B. 68; see also Rev. 
Rul. 56-556, 1956-2 C.B. 177 wherein it is stated that the reacquisition of an employee 
interest "with or without compensation" is prohibited. But see Rev. Rul. 54-408, 1954-2 
C.B. 165, discussed infra note 49, which raises a contrary implication. 
15. 801 F.2d 1176 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'g 83 T.C. 597 (1984). 
16. Lynch, 801 F.2d at 1179. 
17. See Chertkof v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1113 (1979), aft'd, 649 F.2d 264 (4th Cir. 
1981) in which the taxpayer was held to have acquired a prohibited interest in the re-
deeming corporation as the result of powers granted him pursuant to a management 
4
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relationships other than employment are at issue and uncer-
tainty rather than inconsistency hinders proper planning. This 
article will attempt to illustrate the excesses of both the Service 
and the Tax Court positions through an analysis of the Lynch 
decision; and to develop a definitional standard which not only 
deals effectively with the question of a shareholder's status as an 
officer, director or employee, but with other relationships to the 
redeeming corporation as well. 
II. THE LYNCH CASE 
A. FACTS AND COURT ANALYSIS 
On December 17, 1975, William Lynch sold 50 shares of the 
stock of W. M. Lynch Co. to his son.IS At the same time Lynch 
and his wife resigned as officers and directors of the corpora-
tion.I9 Two weeks later the corporation redeemed Lynch's re-
maining shares for a cash down payment and a promissory note 
leaving the son as the sole shareholder.20 
In the years immediately preceding the redemption the son 
had assumed ever increasing managerial responsibility in the 
corporation.21 Nevertheless, on assuming control he' wished to 
retain his father's expertise in the narrow field in which the cor-
poration conducted its business.22 Thus, on the date of the re-
demption, the corporation and Lynch entered into a five year 
consulting agreement, terminable at will by Lynch, which pro-
vided for monthly payments of $500, and the reimbursement of 
business related travel, entertainment and automobile ex-
penses.23 The agreement was modified by mutual consent in 
agreement between the redeeming corporation and a corporation 80% owned by the tax-
payer. Under the Tax Court's view, the powers granted to Chertkof permitted him to 
control corporate policy and thereby affect his share of the income from property which 
he owned jointly with the redeeming corporation. This was deemed to provide Chertkof 
with the necessary financial stake in the redeeming corporation. A similar conclusion 
would undoubtedly by reached under the standard applied by the Ninth Circuit in 
Lynch v. Commissioner, 801 F.2d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 1986) in which any employment 
relationship is prohibited per se. 
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February, 1977 to reduce the monthly payments to $250 and was 
terminated in 1979, one year prior to its expiration date.24 The 
corporation never withheld payroll taxes from the consulting 
fees paid to Lynch.25 
Immediately after the redemption, Lynch went to the cor-
poration's offices daily; he shared offices with his son until 
1979.26 But as time went on, he went to the office less and less.27 
Approximately one year after the redemption, Lynch went to 
the office only once or twice a week, and sometimes he had no 
contact with the corporation for weeks at a time.28 Actual con-
sulting services were rendered only during 1976 and 1977.29 
In addition to the consulting agreement, Lynch remained a 
beneficiary under the corporation's group medical insurance pol-
icy.30 Following the redemption, the corporation paid a total of 
$4,487.54 in net premiums on his behalf until cancellation of his 
coverage under this policy on May 1, 1980.31 He was also covered 
by a medical reimbursement plan, created the day of the re-
demption, which provided a maximum annual payment of 
$1,000 per member.32 Payments to Lynch under this plan to-
taled $96.05.33 
Based on these facts, the Tax Court rejected the govern-
ment's argument that the services rendered by Lynch under the 
consulting agreement constituted a prohibited interest.34 It re-





Thus, in determining whether a prohibited inter-
est has been retained under section 
302(c)(2)(A)(i), we must look to whether the for-
mer stockholder has either retained a financial 
stake in the corporation or continued to control 
28. Lynch, 83 T.e. at 601. 
29.ld. 




34. Lynch, 83 T.e. at 608. 
35. 47 T.e. 129, 136 (1966)(Simpson, J. concurring). 
6
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1988], Art. 13
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol18/iss1/13
1988] TAX LAW 
the corporation and benefit by its operations (ci-
tations omitted). In particular, where the interest 
retained is not that of an officer, director, or em-
ployee, we must examine the facts and circum-
stances to determine whether a prohibited inter-
est has been retained . . . .36 
257 
The Tax Court concluded that Lynch was not an employee 
but an independent contractor since the corporation did not 
have the right under the consulting agreement to control his ac-
tions;37 and that he had not retained a financial stake in the cor-
poration, since his consulting arrangement was not contingent 
on future profits.3s It also found that Lynch did not exert con-
trol over corporate affairs.39 As a result, the Tax Court con-
cluded that Lynch had not retained an interest prohibited by 
section 302(c)(2)(A)(i).40 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit rejected the Tax Court's stan-
dard for determining the existence of a prohibited interest.41 
Based primarily on its perception that the relevant legislative 
history expressed Congress' intent to bring a measure of cer-
tainty to the tax consequences of corporate redemptions, the 
court held that a taxpayer who provides post redemption ser-
vices, either as an employee or an independent contractor, holds 
a prohibited interest in the corporation.42 
The facts and circumstances test advocated by the Tax 
Court was viewed as a functional equal of the flexible but vague 
"dividend equivalence" test of prior law, which had prompted 
Congress to enact the definite standards of section 302(b)(2) and 
(3), and thereby undermined a taxpayer's ability to know the tax 
consequences of a redemption with certainty. The Ninth Circuit 
stated: 
36. Lynch, 83 T.C. at 605. 
37. Control of the means of employment is the traditional test for distinguishing 
employment status from that of an independent contractor. See § 31.3401(c)-1(c) of the 
Employment Tax Regs. 
38. Lynch, 83 T.C. at 606. 
39. [d. at 608. 
40. See supra note 8. 
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"The Tax Court's refusal to recognize that section 
302(c)(2)A)(i) prohibits all noncreditor interests in the corpora-
tion creates the same uncertainty as the 'dividend equivalence' 
test."43 
The court buttressed its conclusion by comparing the Tax 
Court's decision in Lynch with that in Seda v. Commissioner.44 
The latter held, but only after an analysis of all the facts and 
circumstances, that the taxpayer had retained a financial stake, 
and thus a prohibited interest, in the corporation by continuing 
as an employee for two years at a salary of $1,000 per month.45 
The Ninth Circuit considered this result at odds with the deci-
sion in Lynch where the receipt of $500 per month was not a 
financial stake. It pointed to the weakness of ignoring the une-
quivocallanguage of the statute prohibiting retention of employ-
ment status per se, in favor of a facts and circumstances analysis 
that apparently depended on the rate of compensation and com-
promised the desired certainty in predicting tax results.46 
Although Lynch involved an independent contractor 
whereas Seda involved an employee, this factual difference was 
not found to be meaningful.47 The court considered any differ-
ence in result based on the nature of the service relationship to 
be an unwarranted elevation of form over substance, declaring 
"[T]he parenthetical language in section 302(c)(2)(A)(i) merely 
provides a subset of prohibited interests from the universe of 
such interests, and in no way limits us from finding that an in-
dependent contractor retains a prohibited interest."48 
B. CRITIQUE 
The Tax Court's reliance on a facts and circumstances test 
to determine whether a post redemption employment relation-
ship provides a continuing "financial stake" in, or control of, the 
redeeming corporation, is an apparent attempt to interpret the 
parenthetical language of section 302(c)(2)(A)(i) in a manner 
43. Id. 
44. 82 T.e. 484 (1984). 
45. Id. at 488. 
46. Lynch, 801 F.2d at 1179. 
47. Id. at 1180-81. 
48. Id. 
8
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which is consistent with the broad purpose of section 302, to 
prevent a bailout of earnings through the conversion of an ordi-
nary dividend distribution into a capital gain exchange.49 The 
Ninth Circuit decision, on the other hand, looks to a narrower 
legislative purpose, the need to provide certainty in the charac-
terization of a redemption as an ordinary dividend or capital 
gain exchange, and interprets the parenthetical language of sec-
tion 302(c)(2)(A)(i) as requiring any employment relationship to 
be treated as an interest which is prohibited per se.IiO The Tax 
Court ignored the plain language of the statute which unequivo-
cally declares an interest as an officer, director or employee to be 
prohibited, and instead required that the facts be analyzed to 
indicate a continuing financial stake or control. The per se test 
applied on appeal similarly expands the statutory language of 
the parenthetical exception concerning employment status to in-
clude the unspecified relationship of independent contractor as 
one which is prohibited per se.1i1 Each is over zealous in its 
approach. 
By requiring an employment relationship of any kind to be 
coupled with a financial stake in the corporation, the Tax Court 
49. The Tax Court position, as initially formulated by Judge Simpson in his concur-
ring opinion in Lewis v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 129, 137-38 (1966), relied upon Bittker, 
Stock Redemptions and Partial Liquidations Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 
9 STAN. L. REV. 13, 33, n. 72 which reads, in part, as follows: 
Section 302(c)(2)(A)(i) does not explicitly prohibit employ-
ment or office-holding per se; it speaks of" an interest as of-
ficer, director, or employee," and this could be interpreted to 
mean something more than the performance of services alone. 
See Rev. Rul. 54-408, 1954-2 Cum. Bull. 165, implying that a 
majority shareholder whose stock was redeemed had ceased" 
to be interested in the affairs of the corporation;" within the 
meaning of the old regulations . . . even though he remained 
in the employ of the corporation for four years . . . . 
The cited ruling, however, concerns characterization of a redemption under section 
115(g) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 and the accompanying regulations which 
concern a cessation of interest in corporate affairs. The ruling appears more closely re-
lated to a determination as to the termination of interest requirements of I.R.C. § 
302(b)(3), than the statutory restrictions imposed by I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(A)(i), or the pol-
icy considerations underlying the imposition of those restrictions, since family attribu-
tion was not at issue. Therefore, the inference sought to be drawn from the facts of the 
ruling may not be justified. 
50. For an extensive analysis of the legislative history in support of this position see 
Rose, The Prohibited Interest of Sectio'; 302(c)(A), 36 TAX L. REv. 131, 134-140 (1981) 
and Marusic, The Prohibited Interest of I.R.C. Section 302(c)(2)(A) After Seda and 
Lynch, 65 NEB. L. REV. 486, 491-95 (1986). 
51. See Lynch, 801 F.2d at 1179. 
9
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ignored the transactional nature of the payplent of salary for 
services rendered as an exchange, which if made at fair value 
does not create in the service provider a claim against corporate 
assets or earnings.52 Therefore, under the "financial stake" as-
pect of the Tax Court's test the mere exchange of services for 
fair value should never be considered a prohibited interest under 
section 302(c)(2)(A)(i). Accordingly, the Court of Appeals in 
Lynch was correct in concluding that salary level alone was an 
insufficient basis to distinguish between those employment rela-
tionships which provide a prohibited interest and those that do 
not. Using salary as a criteria, either Seda or Lynch53 would ap-
pear to represent a financial stake with a difference existing only 
in the amount of that stake. Recourse to the facts and circum-
stances as advocated by the Tax Court adds nothing to this 
analysis. 
52. The Tax Court and the Service appear to subscribe to this formulation of what 
constitutes a prohibited interest founded on the existence of a financial stake. See Lynch 
v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 597, 606 (1984)("petitioner did not have a financial stake ... 
payments . . . pursuant to the consulting agreement were in no sense contingent on the 
profitability or future operations of the corporation."); Lennard v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 
554, 562 (1974)("[T)here is no evidence that the fee [sic for consulting services payable 
to the redeemed shareholder) was keyed to the net profits of the corporation."). In Rev 
Rul 77-467, 1977-2 C.B. 92, the Service held that a lease of property by the redeemed 
shareholder to the lessee corporation in exchange for fair rental value does not create a 
prohibited interest; it goes on, however, to state that such a relationship may constitute 
a prohibited interest under 1.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(A)(i) "if under the terms of the agreement 
for the use of property the payments to the person whose stock was redeemed are depen-
dent on the corporation's future earnings ••.. " 
53. Arguably, the cases are distinguishable on another basis. Since Seda involves an 
employee and Lynch an independent contractor, it might be inferred from the two deci-
sions that the level of activity necessary to create a financial stake in the corporation 
differs for purposes of the facts and circumstances test as applied by the Tax Court to 
these differing relationships. But references to level of employment appear most appro-
priate to the question of the redeeming shareholder's continued control of the corpora-
tion and not to the existence of a financial stake. See infra notes 81-87 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of how employment, as distinguished from independent 
contractor, stat.us affects the redeemed shareholder's ability to maintain management 
control of the redeeming corporation and favors interpreting the parenthetical language 
of 1.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(A)(i) as a per se prohibited interest. 
Additionally it may be argued that the Tax Court reached its decision in Seda, 
based on the combined level of activity and the failure of the taxpayer to prove "that 
Mr. Seda ceased to be involved in the management of the company after the redemp-
tion." This raises the question of whether the fa~ts and circumstances test is conjunctive 
rather than disjunctive, requiring both a financial stake and control in order to find the 
retention of a prohibited interest. However, this issue was apparently laid to rest in Cer-
one v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1 (1986) in which the Tax Court affirmed the test as dis-
junctive, requiring only a financial stake or control and not both. 
10
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However, if the level of compensation paid does exceed the 
value of the services rendered, a claim against, and thus a finan-
cial stake in, the earnings of the payor corporation is created. 
Nevertheless, this possibility does not justify the Tax Court's 
use of a facts and circumstances test in determining whether an 
employment relationship is a prohibited interest rather than re-
lYing on the specific statutory language to treat such relation-
ship as prohibited per se. The reason underlying the parentheti-
cal exclusion of section 302(c)(2)(A)(i) is not predicated on the 
continued existence or non existence of a continuing financial 
stake in the redeeming corporation. As the following analysis in-
dicates, its rationale lies in limiting the ability of the redeemed 
shareholder to maintain control of the corporation.154 Section 
302(c)(2)(A) is designed to permit one family member to turn 
over control of a closely held corporation to other family mem-
bers and receive exchange 'treatment through the waiver of fam-
ily attribution which would otherwise render section 302(b)(3) 
inapplicable and result in the redemption proceeds being taxed 
as a dividend. ISIS These attribution rules rest on the assumption 
54. See Committee on Taxation, Ass'n of Bar of New York, Recommendations for 
Revision of Internal Revenue Code 1954, at 16 (1955) wherein it is stated: 
The rule as to termination of interest is unrealistic and uncer-
tain in its operation. If it was intended to foreclose the retiring 
stockholder from continuing to exercise control over corporate 
affairs, it will hardly succeed becl!use in the closely held corpo-
ration designation of the retiring stoCkholder as an officer, di-
rector or employee is scarcely necessary. If, as seems more 
likely, it was intended to prevent retention of an economic in-
terest similar to that of a stockholder, fluctuating with the 
welfare of the corporation, the term "interest" seems ade· 
quately descriptive. In any event, retention of the services of 
the former stockholder as an officer, director, or employee at a 
fixed salary would not seem offensive. It is recommended 
therefore that the parenthetical phrase "(including an interest 
as officer, director, or employee)" be eliminated from section 
302(c)(2)(A)(i). 
While it is undoubtedly true that control can be exercised without a formal employ-
ment relationship with the redeeming corporation, this comment fails to recognize that 
the ability to control may be enhanced if such relationships are permitted. Since, as the 
quoted language indicates, the parenthetical exclusion has little relationship to the re-
tention of an economic interest similar to that of a shareholder, it seem reasonable to 
conclude that such language relates to the continuation of stockholder control. 
55. S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 235-36 (1954). The general explanation of 
the Senate report says: "If a shareholder desires to sever completely his interest in a 
corporation which he and his family controls, the rules of family ownership are 
waived ... if the shareholder does not reacquire ... an interest (other than an interest 
as creditor), for a period of 10 years thereafter." 
11
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that certain relationships often involve an economic identity of 
interest.1I6 Thus, in the absence of a waiver of family attribution, 
an economic interest is presumed through attribution. To man-
date a financial or economic stake as an element of a prohibited 
interest under section 302(c)(2)(A) would undermine that pre-
sumption by requiring such an economic stake to exist in fact 
before it could be imputed by attribution.1I7 This would be un-
warranted and leads to the conclusion that the thrust of the par-
entheticallanguage of section 302(c)(2)(A) relates to a retained 
interest which bears on the continued ability of the redeemed 
shareholder to control the corporation. 
Stated differently, the general language of section 
302(c)(2)(A)(i) prohibits the retention of an "interest." For pur-
poses of statutory interpretation, "the words of statutes-in-
cluding revenue statutes-should be interpreted where possible 
in their ordinary, everyday senses (citations omitted). Departure 
from a literal reading of statutory language may on occasion be 
indicated by relevant internal evidence of the statute itself and 
necessary in order to effect the legislative purpose."118 "Interest" 
is defined as "the relation of being objectively concerned in 
something, by having a right or title to, a claim upon, or a share 
in."119 This definition is consistent with the usage accorded "in-
terest" in section 302(b)(3) where it clearly relates to a share-
holder's ownership of the redeeming corporation as evidenced by 
his equity investment.6o There is no need to interpret "interest" 
differently when used in section 302(c)(2)(A)(i) except to the ex-
tent necessary to conform that use to the more specific purpose 
56. See Rickey v. United States, 592 F.2d 1251, 1256 (5th Cir. 1979); Coyle v. United 
States, 415 F.2d 488, 490 (4th Cir. 1968). 
57. That is not to say that the existence of a financial stake or economic interest 
would be ignored. It would clearly constitute a prohibited interest under I.R.C. § 302 
(c)(2)(A). However, the existence of such an economic interest is not, and should not, be 
a prerequisite to such a prohibited interest. 
. 58. Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 571-72 (1966) (citations omitted). 
59. The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford Press (1971). 
The secondary definition is even more to the point: "a pecuniary share or stake in, or 
claim upon anything, the relation of being a part-owner of property, a shareholder in a 
commercial or financial undertaking, or the like." Id. 
60. The sole concern of I.R.C.§ 302 is whether a change in shareholder stock owner-
ship is sufficiently material to warrant capital gain treatment as an exchange. I.R.C. § 
302(b)(3) specifically refers to the complete redemption of a shareholder's stock in the 
corporation as a "Termination of shareholder's interest." 
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of that subsection.61 The elements of continued interest prohib-
ited by section 302(c)(2)(A)(i) should be the same as those rep-
resented by the terminated equity investment modified as neces-
sary, ~o reflect that such rights are no longer delineated by stock 
ownership but, in appropriate circumstances, through other rela-
tionships of the redeemed shareholder to the corporation. A 
stock interest is recognized to have three basic elements: a claim 
against corporate assets, a right to corporate earnings and the 
power to control the corporation through election of its officers 
and directors.62 These are the elements representing an "inter-
est" prohibited by section 302(c)(2)(A)(i). This is tacitly recog-
nized by the Tax Court's reference to a continuing financial 
stake or control of the redeeming corporation.63 However, an 
employment relationship does not ordinarily represent any right 
61. Namely, to permit a waiver of family attribution in connection with a termina-
tion effected by a formal redemption of stock from being less than complete in substance 
because of a continuing nexus between the terminated shareholder and the corporation. 
But see Rose, The Prohibited Interest of Section 302(c)(2)(A), 36 TAX L. REV. 131, 148 
n. 73 (1981) in which it is stated that to give effect to the word "interest" as used in 
subsection 302(c)(2)(A), "it must mean something other than the "interest" referred to 
in subsection (b)(3) ..•• " 
62. See Himmel v. Commissioner, 338 F. 2d 815 (2d Cir. 1964). However, if "inter-
est" as used in I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(A)(i) is intended to embrace only the rights formerly 
represented by a shareholder's equity investment, a creditor interest, being an invest-
ment of a different dimension, would be excluded without the need of a specific exemp-
tion. Why then is a specific exclusion provided? The legislative history is unclear as to 
the purpose of the creditor exception. It has been suggested that the exception permits a 
redemption of shares using the installment method, thereby ameliorating the problem of 
funding the required redemption distribution. See generally Marusic, supra note 50, at 
493 n. 45; Rose, supra note 50, at 159-60; Comment, Complete Stock Redemption in a 
Family Corporation: A Warning About the Pitfalls of Two Standards, 23 VILL. L. REV. 
100, 104-5 (1978). While that is a pragmatic reason for a creditor exception, an explana-
tion consonant with the intention of the statute and the plain meaning of "interest" is 
equally possible. As indicated, I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(A) following the redemption of a stock-
holder's equity investment is intended to prohibit continuing relationships which provide 
similar rights to corporate assets, earnings or control. As a creditor the redeeming share-
holder continues to maintain an investment entitling him to a prior claim on corporate 
assets and earning in the form of interest, thereby creating an investment based relation-
ship at least ostensibly within the intended interdiction of the statute. By specifically 
excluding a creditor relationship, the statute affirms that a prohibited interest relates 
only to relationships which provide rights similar to those enjoyed through equitable 
ownership and not from a temporal advance of funds. 
63. Lewis v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 129, 137 (1966) (Simpson, J. concurring) 
wherein it is stated: "[I]mmediately after the enactment of the 1954 Code, it was recog-
nized that section 302(c)(2)(A)(i) did not prohibit office holding per se, but was con-
cerned with a retained financial stake in the corporation, such as a profit-sharing plan, or 
in the creation of an ostensible sale that really changed nothing so far as corporate man-
agement was concerned." As expressed in supra note 49, this concurring opinion is the 
basis for the Tax Court's interpretation of I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(A)(i). 
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to assets or profits except in exchange for the value of services 
rendered.64 If it bears any similarity to the rights embraced in a 
stock interest it is only in the ability, by virtue of the continuing 
relationship itself, to control corporate conduct. But even this is 
a lesser degree of control than that possessed by a shareholder, 
since a director, officer or employee can be removed by a con-
trolling shareholder.61i In the context of section 302(c)(2)(A)(i), 
however, the diluted control exercised by an officer, director, or 
employee may be greatly enhanced as a result of the family rela-
tionship between the redeemed shareholder and the remaining 
shareholders. To prevent the mischief which that continuing re-
lationship may permit, the parenthetical language characterizes 
the specified employment relationships of director, officer or em-
ployee as per se prohibited interests. By so doing, a potential 
evil, the power to control either through the performance of 
one's duties or through the ability to influence other family 
members as a consequence of a continuing intimacy with corpo-
rate affairs, is precluded and an inquiry as to the actual exercise 
of such power is made unnecessary. 
The Ninth Circuit, however, considers the parenthetical ex-
ception as if it "merely provides a subset of prohibited interests 
from the universe of such interests . . . ."66 rather than as char-
acterizing such employment relationships, which otherwise fall 
outside the intended scope of section 302(c)(2)(A)(i), as per se 
prohibited "interests." It is precisely here that the rationale of 
the Ninth Circuit decision begins to crumble, since this assump-
tion is the foundation used to deny any distinction in treatment 
between the employment relationships excluded by the paren-
theticallanguage of section 302(c)(2)(A)(i) and independent con-
tractors.67 Rather than analyze the differences that may exist be-
tween the excluded employment relationships and an 
independent contractor relationship in terms of the statutory 
purpose of limiting the opportunity to control, the court con-
64. See Palmer v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 63 (1937) in which it was held that the 
distribution of option rights to shareholders entitling them to purchase corporate prop-
erty at its then fair market value did not constitute a dividend distribution, even though 
the option itself had a present value. In addition, it was held that the shareholders did 
not realize income on the spread between market value and option price existing at the 
date of exercise of the option. 
65. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k)(1983). 
66. See Supra text accompanying note 48. 
67. Lynch, 801 F.2d at 1180-81. 
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cludes that all services are prohibited regardless of the capacity 
in which they are rendered.6s That conclusion appears to be un-
warrented. The search for certainty of result should not be ap-
plied to independent contractor relationships, and inferentially 
to all other relationships involving the rendition of services, that 
do not necessarily invoke the same opportunity for corporate 
control as assumed in the statute with respect to the parentheti-
cal exc~ption. As held by the Tax Court, these relationships 
should be prohibited, if at all, only after an inquiry into the 
facts and circumstances indicates the actual exercise of control 
rather than a presumption of control. 
If a former controlling shareholder continues his employ-
ment relationship with the redeeming corporation, it is likely to 
be in a full time position involving decisional authority with re-
spect to fundamental corporate policy in order to take full ad-
vantage of his extensive experience and expertise. This is pre-
cisely the situation in which the opportunity to control is 
greatest and in which the limitation imposed by the parentheti-
cal language of section 302(c)(2)(A)(i) should be applied. To the 
contrary, the interactive possibilities between a former share-
holder as independent contractor, or consultant, and the re-
deeming corporation are likely to be wide ranging, involving in-
ternal management services69 as well as services ordinarily 
provided by third parties,70 both full time and part time, a spec-
trum of relationships too broad to categorize all permutations as 
prohibited without benefit of an analysis of all the facts and 
circumstances. 
The positions of officer, director and employee require the 
personal services of an individual, a direct rendition or involve-
ment as it were, that in each case provides a personal opportu-
nity to influence or affect corporate decisions that are prohibited 
by the statute. Personal involvement and the consequent oppor-
tunity to control is not a necessary element of all independent 
68. Id. at 1179. 
69. See, e.g., Chertkof v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1113 (1979) (taxpayer decided basic 
corporate policy with respect to redeeming corporation's real property interests pursuant 
to a contractual agreement executed by the redeeming corporation with a corporation 
controlled by the taxpayer). 
70. See, e.g., Lennard v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 554 (1974) (taxpayer continued to 
provide monthly and annual accounting services to the redeeming corporation as a mem-
ber of a public accounting firm in which he owned a 48% interest). 
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contractor relationships. What if the taxpayer in Lennard,71 did 
not personally provide the required accounting services, but 
merely supervised? Are supervisory services requiring little or no 
direct contact with the redeeming corporation sufficient to con-
stitute a prohibited interest? Should it be prohibited per se? 
What if only Mr. Lennard's partner provided the necessary ac-
counting services, would Mr. Lennard nevertheless have a pro-
hibited inte{est by virtue of their mutual agency relationship 
under partnership law?72 Must the partnership reject accounting 
work offered by the redeeming corporation in order for Mr. Len-
nard not to possess a prohibited interest? Does he have suffi-
cient control of the partnership to assure such rejection? These 
questions, and others raised by the variety of forms assumed by 
consulting and other service arrangements constituting indepen-
dent contractor relationships, hopefully indicate that the pur-
poses of the statute are not always served by a per se prohibi-
tion, as control is not necessarily at issue. Whereas acceptance of 
employee, officer or director status always provides personal in-
volvement and thereby the opportunity to maintain control of 
the redeeming corporation.73 The latter is presumptively prohib-
ited by the specific language of the statute, the former is not and 
should not be similarly treated. 
71. Id. As indicated, Mr. Lennard continued to provide accounting services to the 
redeeming corporation after the redemption as a member of a public accounting firm of 
which he owned 48%. 
72. An agency relationship was sufficient to constitute a prohibited interest in Rev. 
Rul. 59-119, 1959-1 C.B. 68 with respect to an attorney sitting as a director on the board 
of directors of the redeeming corporation for the sole purpose of monitoring performance 
of the redemption agreement. 
73. This assertion may be controverted by comparing part time employee status 
with an independent contractor relationship involving the rendition of full time services 
to the redeeming corporation. The opportunity to control is greatest with respect to the 
independent contractor and least with respect to the part time employee, and yet if the 
per se prohibition, as suggested, is limited to employees, officers and directors, only the 
latter relationship is prohibited and not the former. However, any hard line rule creates 
the possibility of inequity, either real or perceived, at the point the line is drawn. Here 
that inequity exists in the application of a per se prohibition to part time employees who 
may have little influence on corporate management as compared to full time indepen-
dent contractors or, for that matter, employees. But that is not sufficient reason to sub-
ject independent contractor relationships, which do not necessarily raise the issue of con-
trol, to a per se prohibition otherwise limited by the language of the statute to officers, 
directors and employees. To do so would merely create further inequities as to those 
instances in which the independent contractor relationship does not affect corporate con-
trol, and supports the application of a facts and circumstances test to prohibit only those 
independent contractor relationships which in fact violate the congressional intention to 
prevent continued control of the redeeming corporation. 
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III. THE LYNCH RATIONALE APPLIED TO OTHER 
RELATIONSHIPS 
The Lynch decision is intended to provide certainty in de-
termining the tax consequences of redemption transactions by 
enunciating a bright line rule prohibiting a redeemed share-
holder from rendering services to the redeeming corporation in 
whatever capacity.74 It appears, however, to have the opposite 
effect to the extent the rationale of the decision may be applied 
to redemption transactions involving non service oriented busi-
ness relationships. Although the decision is clearly limited by its 
facts to the performance of services, the desire for certainty of 
result would appear to warrant extension of a per se prohibition 
to other relationships which are substantively similar to service 
relationships in that they also involve a bargained for exchange. 
A. THE REDEEMED SHAREHOLDER AS LESSOR 
If, as suggested in Lynch, the parenthetical exclusion of sec-
tion 302(c)(2)(A)(i) is merely an example of a broader universe 
of prohibited interests, the publicly expressed position of the 
Service,7!> that a redeemed shareholder may continue to lease 
property to the redeeming corporation provided the lease pro-
vides for a fair market value rental which is neither contingent 
on corporate earnings nor subordinated to general creditors, is 
now suspect.76 The ruling states that a lessor relationship "will 
not provide ... an interest ... greater than that of a credi-
tor,"" and thus is not prohibited. 
There is little reason, however, to differentiate a lessor rela-
tionship from a consulting arrangement save that one involves 
payment for the use of property and the other compensation for 
74. Lynch, 801 F. 2d at 1179. 
75. Rev. Rul. 77-467, 1977-2 C.B. 92. 
76. There appears to be little to distinguish fair market value exchanges involving 
the rendition of personal services from transactions involving the use of property which 
involve a fair rental and do not contain a contingent interest in the lessor corporation's 
profits. The lessor/lessee relationship between the redeemed shareholder and the re-
deeming corporation would appear to be fully within that universe of relationships of 
which the parenthetical clause is considered by the Ninth Circuit to be merely an 
example. 
77. Rev. Rul. 77-467, 1977-2 C.B. 92, 93. 
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services rendered. Each is an exchange for value and it does not 
clarify the issue to declare one relationship to represent an in-
terest less than that of a creditor while the other is declared to 
be prohibited per se. Both relationships provide rights which are 
less than those of a creditor: a lessor is ordinarily not entitled to 
payment of rent except on satisfaction of the obligation to pro-
vide quiet enjoyment of the property;78 the consultant is ordina-
rily entitled to payment only with respect to services actually 
rendered.79 In order to justify differing results as to the two rela-
tionships, the parenthetical exclusion must effectively be read to 
prohibit all service type relationships and permit those related 
to property. However, it is difficult to justify a selective exten-
sion of the prohibition expressed by the language of the paren-
thetical clause except in terms of purpose. As the subsequent 
discussion will indicate, that purpose does not support a distinc-
tion between property relationships and service relationships, 
such as those involving independent contractors, not expressly 
prohibited by the parenthetical prohibition.80 It should, there-
fore, be rejected. 
The parenthetical exclusion forecloses whatever opportunity 
might exist for the redeemed shareholder to continue his control 
through an employment relationship. In order to properly per-
form his duties, an officer, director or employee may be expected 
to have a daily,81 continuing, and often intimate, familiarity with 
the affairs of the corporation. Such familiarity is the basis for 
informed judgment and sound advice, without which it is diffi-;-
cult if not impossible to formulate sound policy.82 Thus, con-
78. See Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing Codes and Tenant Remedies: An Integra-
tion, 56 B.D.L. REV. 1, 6 (1976). 
79. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 11-17 at 456 (3d ed. 1987). 
80. See supra notes 64-72 and accompanying text wherein it is argued that the pur-
pose of the parenthetical clause is to limit the redeemed shareholder's opportunity to 
maintain his control of the redeeming corporation. As a consequence, consultative ar-
rangements and similar service relationships which do not present such opportunity 
should be permitted in the same manner as leasing transactions under Rev. Rul. 77-467, 
1977-2 C.B. 92 unless they provide a continuing economic interest in corporate profits. 
81. An independent director most often will not have daily contact with the corpo-
ration; nevertheless he would ordinarily be aware of, and informed about, all important 
issues of corporate policy as that is the inherent responsibility of that relationship. See 
generally L. RIBSTEIN, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS, § 3.04 (1983) 
82. See Chertkof v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1113 (1979) in which the taxpayer con-
tinued to decide basic corporate policy, although in that particular instance control was 
exercised pursuant to a consulting arrangement rather than as an employee. 
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tinuity is the touchstone of employment status that permits the 
redeeming shareholder to remain informed and thereby have his 
voice heard. It is this possibility that the statute guards against, 
not the reality of contro1.83 On the other hand, a lessor relation-
ship, although long term, does not ordinarily provide the same 
daily and continuing access to corporate information and affairs 
and, thus, does not present the same threat of continuing 
contro1.84 
The same analysis cannot be applied to distinguish the em-
ployment relationships prohibited by the parenthetical language 
from all independent contractor relationships. Clearly, there are 
those which do provide the same opportunity to exercise control 
as the parenthetically excluded relationships;85 relationships in 
which the redeemed shareholder renders consultative services 
solely to the redeeming corporation on a consistent and exclu-
sive basis is an apt example.86 However, it should be equally 
clear that the ad hoc performance of service for the redeeming 
corporation as part of the rendition of consulting services on a 
broader basis to the general public, or a particular segment of 
the public which includes the redeeming corporation, is not an 
arrangement which in the ordinary course breeds continuity of 
information permitting an informed voice in the formulation of 
policy. 
Since the statute does not support application of the paren-
thetical exclusion to all consulting arrangements, it should not 
be extended selectively to embrace certain of those relationships 
83. See Seda v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 484 (1984) in which the taxpayer's continued 
employment by the redeeming corporation was sufficient to prevent a waiver of family 
attribution as a result of I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(A) even though no showing was made as to 
the scope of the taxpayer's duties. The Tax Court justified the result reached based on 
the existence of a financial stake in the redeeming corporation represented by the tax-
payers monthly salary. The concurring opinion would have relied on the parenthetical 
clause of I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(A) as providing a per se prohibition to continued employee 
status. Id. at 490-91 (Whitaker, J. concurring). 
84. That is not to say that a lessor necessarily lacks influence. If the property under 
lease is essential to the operation of the corporation, a certain degree of economic lever-
age may exist in the lessor. However, the statute is apparently directed against continu-
ing control over the formulation of corporate policy that shapes individual decisions and 
not at the ability to influence specific decisions on an ad hoc basis. See Chertkof v. Com-
missioner, 72 T.C. 1113, 1124-25 (1979) ("[T]hese powers over the only business as-
set . • . provided petitioner the wherewithal to control all . . . major policy decisions"). 
85. See supra note 82. 
86. See supra note 82. 
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while excepting other ad hoc consulting arrangements as well as 
property relationships. Therefore, the rationale underlying 
Lynch to the extent it implies a broader application of the par-
enthetical prohibition of section 302(c)(2)(A)(i) is erroneous. It 
should be strictly and consistently applied solely to the employ-
ment relationships therein designated. A lessor relationship such 
as that described in Rev. Rul. 77-467 does not present an issue 
of corporate control and, thus, should not be considered a pro-
hibited interest,87 although for reasons other than those ex-
pressed in the ruling. 
B. ENGAGING IN BUSINESS WITH THE REDEEMED CORPORATION 
The Service has ruled privately that a redeemed share-
holder who, post redemption, is engaged as a sole proprietor in 
the business of goldsmithing and jewelry design may transact 
business with the redeeming corporation provided there are no 
long term contracts or commitments to do so and payments 
under the relationship represent fair value.88 Similarly, the Ser-
vice apparently countenances joint venture activities between a 
redeemed shareholder and the redeeming corporation as a rela-
tionship which does not constitute a prohibited interest under 
section 302(c)(2)(A).89 
These relationships clearly call into question the limits of 
the Lynch decision. The sole proprietor in Priv. Ltr. Rul. 
87. The Service maintains this view; it has continued, following Lynch to issue pri-
vate letter rulings which affirm that a redeemed shareholder's lease of property to the 
redeeming corporation does not constitute a prohibited interest under I.R.C. § 
302(c)(2)(A)(i) or (ii). See Priv. Ltr. Ruls. 8719024 (Feb. 9, 1987); 8714059 (Jan. 7, 1987); 
8711072 (Dec. 16, 1986); and 8702070 (Oct. 16, 1986). 
88. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8208164 (Nov. 30, 1981). 
89. In Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8313125 (Dec. 30,1982) the Service approved a redemption in 
which joint venture activities with respect to construction contracts were contemplated, 
but not as yet required by contract or agreement, between a redeeming corporation en-
gaged in the business of leasing construction equipment and a second corporation wholly 
owned by the shareholder whose stock had been redeemed by the leasing corporation. 
Apart from the contemplated joint venture, the second corporation leased construction 
equipment from the leasing corporation at standard rates. In Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8326059 
(Mar. 28, 1983), amending Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8305013 (Oct 28, 1982), the Service approved 
the redeeming corporation contracting or subcontracting work to a corporation appar-
ently controlled by the redeemed shareholder or persons whose stock would be attributa-
ble to him. 
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8208164 provided not only goods but goldsmithing and jewelry 
design services to the redeeming corporation.90 A joint venture, 
depending upon the specific project in which it is engaged, also 
may involve both goods and services although technically both 
are rendered on behalf of the venture rather than the redeeming 
corporation.91 Pursuant to Lynch, these post redemption ser-
vices should constitute the retention or acquisition of a prohib-
ited interest by the redeeming shareholder under either section 
302(c)(2)(A)(i) or (ii) thereby preventing an effective waiver of 
family attribution and causing the associated redemption to be 
characterized as a dividend. Since the statute requires that the 
redeemed shareholder have "no interest in the corporation"92 
and does not permit the redeeming shareholder to "acquire any 
such interest"93 the magnitude of the service element of the joint 
venture or product sales activities would appear to be irrelevant. 
This statutory language does not easily admit to an interpreta-
tion which permits de minimus services to be ignored. Will the 
Service apply this analysis and change its present position con-
cerning joint venture and vendor relationships between the re-
deemed shareholder and the redeeming corporation or will that 
position be maintained despite Lynch? Should it be? 
The sale of goods to the redeeming corporation, like the 
rendition of services, is an exchange of values from which 
neither the redeemed shareholder nor the redeeming corporation 
derives an unwarranted benefit or suffers an economic detri-
ment.94 Thus, the sale of goods is not essentially different from 
the leasing transaction described in Rev. Rul. 77-467,95 except 
90. See Supra note 88. 
91. In similar situations both the Service and the courts have ignored the fact that 
services were rendered to the redeeming corporation by a person other than the redeem-
ing shareholder. See Rev. Rul. 59-119, 1959-1 C.B. 68 (prohibited interest found where 
an attorney acting as agent of redeeming shareholder served as a director of the redeem-
ing corporation)j Chertkof v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1113 (1979) aU'd, 649 F.2d 264 (4th 
Cir. 1981)(managerial services rendered by a redeemed shareholder to the redeeming cor-
poration through another corporation which he controlled were held to constitute a pro-
hibited interest). 
92. I.R.C. § 302(c)(2)(A)(i). 
93. 1. R.C.§ 302(c)(2)(A)(ii). Such prohibition is for a period of ten years following 
the redemption. 
94. See Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. U.S., 126 F. Supp. 184 (Ct. Cl. 1954) 
wherein it is stated with respect to an exchange of property between unrelated parties 
that "the value of the two properties exchanged in an arms-length transaction are either 
equal in fact, or presumed to be equill." 
95. 1977-2 C.B. 92. 
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for the fact that a more clearly defined element of personal ser-
vices may attach to the former. Perhaps this is the reason that 
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8208164 restricts the proprietorship from render-
ing goldsmithing and jewelry design services to the redeeming 
corporation under a long term contract or commitment. No such 
restriction is placed on a leasing arrangement; the lease in Rev. 
Rul. 77-467 had an original term of ten years with five years re-
maining at the time of the redemption.96 This apparently repre-
sents a concern that a continuing relationship presents an op-
portunity for the redeemed shareholder to exercise control over 
the redeeming corporation. This is precisely the issue presented 
by services rendered as an employee or independent contractor 
and yet in the context of a vendor relationship the Service per-
mits continuity as long as it is not mandated by contract, 
whereas in an independent contractor relationship a per se pro-
hibition is imposed apparently without respect to the duration 
of the arrangement.97 
Since Lynch affirms what appears to be the long standing 
position of the Service that independent contractor relationships 
are prohibited per se,98 there is no reason to believe that any 
change in position will be manifested toward vendor/vendee or 
joint venture relationships as a matter of ruling policy. The 
same inconsistency exists now as previously in that the nature of 
the service relationship as it bears on the issue of control is ig-
nored contrary to what appears to be the intent of the paren-
thetical exclusion of section 302(c)(2)(A)(i). However, by treat-
ing services performed pursuant to a vendor/vendee relationship 
differently than services performed pursuant to an independent 
contractor relationship, certainly does not help to provide cer-
tainty in determining the tax results of redemption transactions, 
the avowed purpose of the statutory exclusion as stated in 
Lynch.99 This inconsistency apparently requires an inquiry into 
the nature and degree of the services performed pursuant to a 
vendor/vendee and joint venture relationships to determine if 
there is continuity and actual control but imposes a per se pro-
96. [d. 
97. Admittedly the independent contractor relationship in Lynch v. Commissioner, 
801 F.2d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1986) existed pursuant to a five year contract, but that fact 
does not appear to be critical to the decision. 
98. Rev. Rul. 70-104, 1970-1 C.B. 66. 
99. Lynch, 801 F. 2d at 1179. 
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hibition with respect to an independent contractor relationship. 
It would appear that the characteristic which distinguishes these 
relationships is that the former involves ad hoc services to the 
redeeming corporation as well as the general public; in other 
words, holding out to do business generally and not merely with 
the redeeming corporation. But the same can be said of certain 
independent contractor relationships, and, as such, all indepen-
dent contractor relationships should be subject to the same fac-
tual inquiry rather than prohibited per se in Lynch. Perhaps 
that inquiry should not, as in LennardlOo and Lynch,lOl stress 
the common law distinction between an employee and an inde-
pendent contractor, but the nature of the service relationship it-
self in light of the underlying statutory purpose to inhibit con:" 
tinuing control by the redeemed shareholder. 
In the absence of a long term contract or commitment 
which raises the issue of continuing control, the Service appears 
to permit an exchange of goods and services because the re-
deemed shareholder does not have an economic stake in the cor-
poration, since he has neither a claim on corporate profits nor 
assets,102 but merely the right to payment for the item sold or 
exchanged. Although not specifically stated, an exchange is ap-
parently considered to create a prohibited interest within the 
meaning of section 302(c)(2)(A) only if it generates an economic 
benefit to the redeemed shareholder while also causing an eco-
nomic detriment to the redeeming corporation. This criteria is 
applicable to a vendor/vendee relationship as well as the lease 
approved in Rev. Rul. 77-467;103 both are exchanges in which 
each party derives a business motivated benefit but not at the 
expense of the other. The necessity of a detriment to the re-
deeming corporation as a necessary element to the retention of a 
prohibited interest is exemplified by the Service's approval of 
continued group insurance coverage for the redeemed share-
holder.104 The redeemed shareholder clearly derives a benefit 
100. Estate of Lennard, 61 T.C. 554 (1974). 
101. Lynch, 801 F. 2d 1176 (9th Cir. 1986). 
102. See supra note 64 and, more generally, B.BlTI'KER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL IN-
COME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, § 15.08 (1979) in which only sales 
between related corporations at other than fair market value are discussed as presenting 
dividend issues; thus, inferentially, sales at market value do not present a claim against 
the assets of the selling corporation. 
103. 1977-2 C.B. 92. 
104. See Priv. Ltr. Ruls. 8236037 (June 8, 1982) (group medical insurance); 7937081 
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from this transaction since the cost of group coverage is ordina-
rily less than equivalent individual coverage. But apparently 
that is not considered determinative in the absence of an eco-
nomic detriment to the corporation.loc) It is not a prohibited in-
terest because the corporation has not used the continuing rela-
tionship to distribute assets or earnings to the redeemed 
shareholderlo6 in a manner similar to a distribution in respect of 
any investor's "interest" in the distributing corporation. 
This conclusion is not so clearly appropriate when applied 
to a joint venture relationship as distinguished from that of a 
vendor/vendee. Nevertheless, upon analysis it appears correct. 
In a joint venture each party must devote capital and/or services 
to the activities of the venture on a continuing basis in order to 
derive a shared profit.lo7 As a consequence, a redeemed share-
holder who participates in the venture could be viewed as retain-
ing a prohibited interest in the redeeming corporation in the 
form of the personal profit derived from his continued use of 
those assets of the redeeming corporation devoted to joint ven-
ture activities. But this overlooks the value received by the cor-
poration from the joint venture. It has risked the use of its as-
sets in exchange for the profit potential inherent in the venture 
as has the redeeming shareholder. Neither derives an advantage 
(June 18, 1979) (group accident and health insurance) and 8021099 (Feb. 28 1980) (life 
insurance). In order that the redeeming corporation not suffer an out of pocket detri-
ment the redeemed shareholder is required to reimburse the corporation for the premi-
ums and administrative costs associated with this coverage. 
105. A similar result reached in I.R.C. § 132(a)(1) which provides for the exclusion 
from income of any service provided to an employee if the employer ordinarily offers 
such service to customers in the ordinary course of its business and "the employer incurs 
no substantial additional cost (including foregone revenues) in providing such service to 
the employee .... " 
106. A similar conclusion was reached in Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8237078 (June 17, 1982) in 
which a sublease of p~operty by the redeeming corporation to the redeemed shareholder 
at a less than fair market value rental, but one equal to the corporation's prime lease 
rental obligation, was not considered the retention of a prohibited interest under section 
302(c)(2)(A)(i). However, the corporation does in fact suffer a detriment in that transac-
tion, since the intangible value of the lease (the difference between The corporation's 
rental cost and the fair rental value of the property) could have been realized in an arms 
length sublease. Apparently, the Service either overlooked this benefit or erroneously 
viewed a detriment to exist only if tangible asset values were made available to the re-
deeming shareholder rather than an economic expectancy. 
107. A joint venture for tax purposes is viewed as a partnership established for a 
single business venture. See Podell v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 429, 431 (1970). For the 
characteristics necessary to a partnership relationship generally, see W. MCKEE. W. NEL-
SON AND R. WHITMIRE. FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS. § 3.02 (1978). 
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from the capital or services of the other except to the extent 
that the interaction of both may produce profits not available to 
either acting alone. Thus, there is an exchange in which each 
participant risks its capital or services in the joint venture in 
pursuit of greater profits, rather than deploying those resources 
in an alternative enterprise. Neither has obtained an advantage 
to the detriment of the other. Consequently, the coupling of a 
redeeming shareholder benefit with a detriment to the redeem-
ing corporation necessary to the retention of a prohibited inter-
est is absent.los 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Lynch goes 
too far in holding all employment relationships to be prohibited 
within the meaning of section 302(c)(2)(A). By creating a so 
called "bright line" rule in order to provide certainty in forecast-
ing the consequences of redemption transactions, it will, in fact, 
foster uncertainty as to the consequences of other legitimate, 
post redemption relationships which involve the rendition of ser-
108. A somewhat imperfect analogy may exist if the corporation were to guarantee a 
debt of the redeeming shareholder to a third party lender. This provides an immediate 
benefit to the redeeming shareholder and at least a potential detriment to the corpora-
tion if it must make good on the guarantee. However, if the shareholder were to pay the 
corporation fair value for such guarantee the potential detriment is removed. In the joint 
venture situation, the corporation is compensated for its potential detriment, by the re-
deeming shareholders corresponding risk of his capital and/or services. A similar use of 
corporate assets has been condoned by the Service in a debtor/creditor context. In Priv. 
Ltr. Rul. 8315049 (Jan 13, 1983) a redeemed shareholder was permitted to maintain his 
indebtedness to the corporation pursuant to a five year note payable monthly at five 
percent interest without the continuing debtor relationship being considered a prohib-
ited interest. Provided the interest in question is reasonable at the time the note is exe-
cuted, the corporation is in receipt of adequate consideration for the use of its funds in 
the same manner fair rent compensates for the use of property as approved in Priv. Ltr. 
Rul. 8328088 (April 14, 1983) (service approved redeemed shareholder lease of office 
space from redeeming corporation at a fair rental). However, the Service apparently was 
in error when it approved a $500,000 borrowing of corporate funds by the redeemed 
shareholder pursuant to a non interest bearing demand note as not constituting a pro-
hibited interest. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8311011 (Dec. 8, 1982). The ruling predates the enact-
ment of 1.R.C. § 7872 by The Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-369, § 172, 98 stat. 699 
(1984), which is intended to overrule existing precedent by subjecting the economic ben-
efit derived from below market rate loans to tax. Since it is now clear that a taxable 
benefit is derived from the interest free use of borrowed funds, such benefit, coupled 
with the detriment incurred by the corporation resulting from its failure to realize inter-
est income or an investment benefit from the alternative deployment of the borrowed 
funds, should now constitute the retention of a prohibited interest pursuant to I.R.C. § 
302(c)(2)(A)(i) or (ii). 
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vices to the redeeming corporation. 
Literally applied, the rule in Lynch prohibits all relation-
ships in which the sale of goods and services are involved, unless 
the statutory language is interpreted as permitting some degree 
of service which does not rise to the dignity of a prohibited in-
terest. But if such an interpretation were possible, similar crite-
ria should be applied to distinguish between those independent 
contractor relationships having characteristics which mirror the 
employment relationships prohibited by the literal language of 
the statute and those service relationships unlikely to provide 
current, relevant information which enables the redeemed share-
holder to influence the formulation of policy on an informed ba-
sis. Ad hoc independent contractor, vendor/vendee, and joint 
venture relationships do not provide even this appearance of 
control and should be prohibited only upon a showing that the 
redeemed shareholder actually exercises control of, or maintains 
a financial stake in, the affairs of the redeeming corporation. 
It could be argued that those consultative arrangements 
that foster the same relationship to the corporation in terms of 
continuity of information as an officer, director or employee re-
lationship should be prohibited not because actual control is ex-
ercised by the redeemed shareholder, but solely on the basis of 
that similarity. The difficulty with this argument, as presented 
and approved in Lynch,109 is that it is based on a presumption of 
control which is not specifically provided by the statute. Once 
created it is difficult to formulate a basis upon which such pre-
sumption can be selectively applied to exclude relationships 
which do not project the potential evil embodied by consultative 
relationships involving services rendered only for the the re-
deemed corporation and those consultative relationships involv-
ing ad hoc services performed in other contexts. 
109. Lynch, 801 F.2d at 1179-81. 
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